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Lazer: Endangered Species Act

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Leon Lazer:
Thank you. The end is near. I am going to talk to you about
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon.1 This case deals with the Endangered Species Act. 2 We
do not deal too often here on Long Island with that Act. We have
some familiarity with it and, of course, many of us remember the
famous snail darter case where that small fish became the basis for
preventing the building of the Tellico Dam.3 Now, the Babbitt case
is a very interesting legislative construction case. I recommend it to
you because as municipal lawyers, many of you are constantly
dealing with problems of how to interpret particular legislative or
regulatory language. This case has it all, including analysis of
legislative history and analysis of the various canons of
construction, including the matter of deference to a regulatory
official or regulation, which I think under the decisions of the New
York Court of Appeals and the New York courts, is a very great
deference. Therefore, if you have such a case and you take a look
at Babbittand the opinions in Babbitt, you may be able to get some
help.
In any event, what is involved in Babbitt is a regulation of the
Department of the Interior, which declares that it is unlawful under
the Endangered Species Act to significantly degrade or modify the
habitat of an endangered species. 4 The issue in the case is whether
the Secretary of the Interior, in promulgating this regulation, had
the power to do so based on the underlying congressional act.5 The
1. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
2. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 15311543 (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The Endangered Species Act "contains a variety
of protections designed to save from extinction species that the Secretary of the
Interior designates as endangered or threatened." Babbitt, 115 S. Ct. 2409.
3. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (prohibiting
the completion of a dam where its operation would destroy the endangered snail
darter or its habitat).
4. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994). See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
5. Babbitt, 115 S.Ct. at 2409.
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lawsuit was brought by various forest interests, logging companies
and farmers, people who make a living from forestry products and
their organizations. The relief sought was a declaratory judgment
that the regulation was beyond the power of the Secretary and,
6
therefore, invalid.
The decision, yours, mine and that of the Court, as to what is
right in this case turns obviously on language. Section 9 of the
Endangered Species Act, which is the section in issue in this case,
states that "it is unlawful ... to take any such species within the

United States or the territorial sea of the United States." 7 The key
word is "take." What does that mean? In further sections of the
Act, Congress defines "take." "The term 'take' means to harass,
harm," -- hold on to that word for a moment -- "pursue, hunt,

shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture or collect, or attempt to engage in
any such conduct." 8 Does this language imply the use of direct
force against the animal or fish? That, of course, is part of the issue
in this case, and I suppose for a time that is the way that language
was viewed.
However, the Interior Department by regulation further defined
the word "harm," one of those words that I just read to you: "Harm
in the definition of 'take' in the Act means an act which actually
kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 9 What the case turned
on. of course, is whether the statute implies direct use of force, and
the Secretary expanded that into indirect force, 10 without the
power or authority of the statute. The declaratory judgment action
challenged application of the regulation to the red-cockaded
woodpecker and the northern spotted owl.

6. Id. at 2410. The respondents claimed that "application of the 'harm'

regulation to the red-cockaded woodpecker, an endangered species, and the
northern spotted own, a threatened species, had injured them economically." Id.
7. 16 US.C.A. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
8. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(19).
9. Babbitt, 115 S. Ct. at 2410 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994)).
10. Id. at 2411.
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At the district court level, the plaintiffs argued that the statute did
not intend the word "harm" to include habitat modification. They
made three arguments in that direction. The first argument was that
habitat modification was included in the original bill draft but the
Senate deleted it.11 The second argument was that section 5 of the
Act itself gives the Secretary the power and the funds to buy
habitats. 12 Thus, if habitat degradation is to be prevented, then it
will be done under the funding provisions of the Act, not by
declaring it unlawful for someone to degrade or modify habitat
when actually the statute is directed against direct application of
force against the animal, such as killing or injuring it.13
Furthermore, plaintiffs claimed that the word "harm" - that one
word I asked you to focus on for a moment - was included as a
floor amendment during the debate in 1973 when the Act was
passed, and it was included without any comment. Therefore, the
word "harm" should be read very narrowly. 14 Additionally, the
plaintiffs claim -- and this is threaded throughout the case and
discussed, of course, by both the majority and dissent -- the issue
lends itself to be the interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, which we
largely refer to, I think, in New York as "a word is known by the
company it keeps." 15 The company that "harm" keeps in the
statute is to harass, pursue, hunt shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,
collect, et cetera, et cetera.
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments and sustained
the regulation. 16 The Court of Appeals reversed and decided that
the word "harm" should not be read as expansively as the Secretary
of the Interior read it. 17 The D.C. Circuit, in deciding the ease and
11. Id at 2410-11.
12. Id at 2411. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1534(a)(2) provides that the Secretary "is

authorized to acquire by purchase, donation, or otherwise, lands, waters, or
interest therein, and such authority shall be in addition to any other land
acquisition authority vested in him." Id.
13. Babbitt, 115 S. Ct. at 2411.
14. Id
15. Id (citing Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 708-09 (1878)).

16. Id The court found the word "take" to have an expansive interpretation
that includes habitat modification.
17. Id
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reversing the district court, failed, and perhaps refused, to mention
18
a Ninth Circuit case that went the other way.
Of course, it is this conflict between the two circuits that resulted
in certiorari by the Supreme Court, which then took the case and
decided by a vote of six to three that the regulation was valid. 19
Sympathetic as I am to the result here, I must say that I found some
of the reasoning of Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, to be
somewhat on the weak side. For instance, he writes that if you look
at the Webster's Third New International Dictionary. which is the
dictionary we are told is the one you should use in brief writing or
decision writing, the words "hurt" or "damage" never include the
18. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d
1106 (9th Cir. 1988). In Pallia, the Sierra Club and other plaintiffs sought to
end the government's practice of maintaining feral sheep, mouflon sheep and
goats within the habitat of the palila, an endangered six inch long finch. Id. at
1107. The palila depends on mamane trees for its food, shelter and nesting,
however, habitat degradation resulted when the sheep and goats fed on the
mamane seedlings, thus preventing its growth and eventually would prevent the

regeneration of these essential woodlands. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's holding that "harm" includes habitat destruction that would
eventually cause an endangered species into extinction. Id. at 1108. It noted that
the interpretation is consistent with the Secretary's definition of "harm,"
including "not only direct physical injury, but also injury caused by impairment
of essential behavior patterns via habitat modification that can have significant
and permanent effects on a listed species." Id.
19. Babbitt, 115 S. Ct. at 2412. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which Justices O'Connor. Kennedy. Souter. Ginsburg and Breyer
joined. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Scalia
dissented, in which Justices Rehnquist and Thomas joined. The majority set
forth three reasons for finding the Secretary's interpretation of "harm" to be
reasonable: "First, an ordinary understanding of the word 'harm' supports [the
Secretary's interpretation." Id. at 2412. "Second, the broad purpose of the
[Endangered Species Act] supports the Secretary's decision to extend protection
against activities that cause the precise harms Congress enacted the statute to
avoid." Id. at 2413. Lastly,
the fact that Congress in 1982 authorized the Secretary to issue permits
for takings that § 9(a)(1)(B) would otherwise prohibit, "if such taking is
incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise
lawful activity," 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B), strongly suggests that
Congress understood § 9(a)(l)(B) to prohibit indirect as well as
deliberate takings.
id. at 2414.
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word "directly," so damage or hurt can be indirect and, obviously,
habitat modification is indirect hurt.20 There is a reluctance by
Justice Stevens to treat any of the words as redundant. 2 1 If "harm"
simply means shoot, kill, capture, collect, what was the point of
putting it in? It must have had some specific force behind it to have
been inserted on the floor of the Senate, and Senator Tunney, the
offeror of the amendment, must have had something else in mind
22
besides the other nine words.
Finally, of course, the decision refers to another element in
legislative construction. In 1982 Congress amended the
Endangered Species Act to provide that the Secretary of Interior
could issue permits that would involve the taking -- remember the
word "taking" -- of Endangered Species if it was incidental to
another lawful use.2 3 The majority's view is that these permits
really were for the loggers or for the farmers or for the foresters or
whatever to be able to go on with their enterprises even though
degradation and habitat modification was involved. Thus, if
Congress never intended habitat modification to be involved in
section 9, requiring permits, they never would have amended the
statute to provide for the issuance of permits. 24
Justice Stevens tried to meet the noscitur a sociis argument, "a
word is known by the company it keeps," head on by declaring that
25
a word in that context can have an independent meaning.
Secondly, he said -- and I have some problems with it -- words
such as "harass," "pursue," "wound" and "kill" do not necessarily
refer to direct force. 26 Well, perhaps on first blush they do, but
maybe if you think about it a while, I suppose you could kill
20. Id at2412-13.
21. Id at 2413.
22. Id. at 2416-17. The Court found that "[a]n obviously broad word that
the Senate went out of its way to add to an important statutory definition is
precisely the sort of provision that deserves a respectful reading." Id. at 2417.
23. Id at2417-18.
24. Id

25. Id at 2415. The Court stated that "'[t]he Secretary's interpretation of
'harm'

to include indirectly injuring endangered animals through habitat

modification permissibly interprets 'harm' to have 'a character of its own not to
be submerged by its association."' Id (citation omitted).
26. Id
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indirectly and, indeed, by habitat modification and degradation,
you do kill indirectly.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia declared that section 5, which
empowers the Secretary to buy habitat property and to pay for it,
provides the protection that the habitats are supposed to get. 27 That
argument was rejected by Justice Stevens and the majority. The
response that they make is that funding habitat protection is done
before destruction, but section 9, which is the one we are dealing
28
with, is a criminal statute enforceable after the destruction.
Finally, and I mentioned this before, the majority said deference
and latitude must be given to the Secretary, 29 and the statute, of
course, does give various powers to the Secretary. "When
Congress has entrusted the Secretary with broad discretion, we are
especially reluctant to substitute our views of wise policy for
his." 30 On that basis, the majority reversed the D.C. Circuit.
Justice O'Connor wrote an interesting opinion 31 and one that
drew a rather cutting response from Justice Scalia that I will detail
for you in a few moments. Justice O'Connor concurred with the
majority provided that habitat protection or regulation was limited
to significant habitat modification, such that causes actual death
and "the regulation's application is limited by ordinary principles
of proximate causation
which introduce notions of
'
'32
foreseeability.
Now that is interesting because she and Justice
Scalia then drifted into a discussion of proximate cause and notions
of foreseeability. 33 As a tort teacher, and I know my colleague here
is a tort teacher as well, I did not think it was a very learned
discussion. Justice Scalia ended up taking a simple quote out of
27. Id. at 2427-28. Justice Scalia explained that Congress clearly intended
that "'habitat destruction on private lands is to be remedied by public acquisition.
and not by making particular unlucky landowners incur 'excessive cost to
themselves."' Id.at 2428.
28. Id.at 2415.
29. Id.at 2418.
30. Id.
31. Id.at 2418-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. Id.at 2418.
33. Id at 2420 (O'Connor, J., concurring) and 2429-30 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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context as to proximate cause and spoke in terms of proximate
cause as "direct." By this time we know that proximate cause gets
pretty indirect under certain circumstances.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote a number of
things that sort of riled her colleague, Justice Scalia, by stating that
"to make it impossible for an animal to reproduce, [you must]
impair its most essential physical functions [rendering the]
animal ...obsolete. ' 34 "Breeding, feeding and sheltering are what
animals do. If significant habitat modification, by interfering with
these essential behaviors, actually kills or injures an animal
protected by the Act, it causes 'harm' [remember "harm"?] within
the meaning of the regulation." 35
In discussing proximate cause, Justice O'Connor stated that it
cannot be too precise.36 Bear this in mind, she was responding to
Justice Scalia's example of the farmer who by plowing causes
some erosion and some silt drifts into the river and that silt then
kills the fish.37 Has the farmer committed a crime under the Act.
which, incidentally, has severe penalties for knoving violation of
the Act and civil fines for unknowing violation of the Act? It is a
strict liability act. On the question of proximate cause. Justice
O'Connor made an interesting comment that "proximate causation
'normally eliminates the bizarre."' 38
Three judges dissented.3 9 Justice Scalia wrote what is a very
sharp opinion, starting out by giving us his property rights
philosophy.40 He stated, "I think it unmistakably clear that the
legislation at issue here (1) forbade the hunting and killing of
endangered animals, and (2) provided federal lands and federal
funds for the acquisitionofprivate lands, to preserve the habitat of
34. Idat 2419.

35. IdJustice O'Connor determined that "by use of the word "actuall),' the
regulation clearly rejects speculative or conjectural effects, and thus itself
invokes principles of proximate causation." Id. at 2420.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1049 (1995)).

39. Justices Scalia, Rehnquist and Thomas dissented. Id. at 2421-31.
40. Id. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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endangered animals."'4 1 That, of course, is the argument that the
penal sections of the Act were not intended to protect against
degradation. If you want to protect against degradation of the
habitat, buy the property.
He continued by stating that "[tjhe Court's holding that the
hunting and killing prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on
private lands imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin -- not
just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land
conscripted to national zoological use."'42 That is the view of the
property protection majority of the Court in most cases and it has
been expressed by Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia rather
repeatedly. If something is important to the public, whether it be
the preservation of wetlands, the preservation of landmarks, or, as
here, the preservation of the endangered species, the public should
pay for it and not impose the cost of maintaining it for the public
on a private property owner. That has been repeatedly said and
now, in a series of cases, has become the basis for overthrowing
43
land use regulation.
Justice Scalia then pointed at the Ninth Circuit case that I
mentioned to you that upheld the regulation of the Commissioner,
and that is the case involving the protection of palilas. 44 In that
case. sheep grazing mamane seeds -- did you know that there was
such a thing as manane seeds -- prevented the seeds from growing
into mamane trees which are the type that palilas feed and nest in.
Therefore. by permitting these sheep to eat the seedlings, there was
a violation of this regulation. 45 I tend to agree with Justice Scalia
that this is sort of a remote proximate causation, if I have ever seen
it. Justice Scalia went on to attack at every angle the majority
41. Id. (emphasis in original).
42. 1d.
43. Id. at 2431. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316
(1994) (stating that "[o]ne of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause [of
the Fifth Amendment] is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."') (citation omitted).
44. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d
1106 (9th Cir. 1988), supra note 18.
45. 1d. at 1110.
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opinion and dealt with each of their arguments. On the question of
the meaning of the word "take," he cited five different dictionaries
as to its meaning, showing that traditionally when "take" is used to
catch an animal, that is a direct force. 46 He then dealt with
legislative history. 47 Both sides indulged a rather selective method
of using legislative history.
Ultimately, Justice Scalia stated that what is involved in the
controversy is not the killing of animals but the impairment of
breeding which would prevent the increase of the population of
animals, and Congress never really had an intent to deal with
breeding. Therefore, the regulation clearly exceeded what Congress
ever intended in that legislation. 48 He then hit rather hard at the
majority statement that the broad purpose of the Act invited
support -- in the snail darter case, the majority had upheld the Act,
saying we must uphold the purposes "at any cost." 49 In Justice
Scalia's view, if purpose is the standard by which you make these
details, well, then all the other standards are insignificant and must
be lost.50 In the end, Justice Scalia weakened what I think was a
fairly strong opinion by getting into proximate cause which he
should not have done because that reasoning does not hold water.
Finally, Justice Scalia declared in a footnote that Justice
O'Connor was imputing to animals the ability or the capacity to
46. Babbitt, 115 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent provides
the following citations of sources defining "take":
See, e.g., II Oxford English Dictionary (1933) ("Take ...Too catch,

capture (a wild beast, bird, fish, etc.)"); Webster's New International
Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed. 1949) (take defined as
"to catch or capture by trapping, snaring, etc., or as prey"); Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896) ("[A]II the animals which can
be taken upon the earth, in the sea, or in the air, that is to say, wild
animals, belong to those who take them") (quoting the Digest of
Justinian); 2 NV. Blackstone, Commentaries 411 (1766) ("Every

man... has an equal right of pursuing and taking to his own use all
such creatures as are ferae naturae").
Id

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id at 2422-23.
Id at2430.
Id at 2425-26.
Idat 2426.
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suffer psychic injury -- a psychic injury that inflicts harm on the
animal as it perceives "it will leave this world with no issue.' 5 1 He
then added that under this theory an endangered species of slug
would suffer psychic injury when it perceived its inability to leave
issue. 52
On that basis now eight minutes after four, I thank you for your
patience and I wonder if you were becoming an endangered species
based on the heat in this room. Do not forget that we will be having
Justice Scalia -- do not tell him what I said -- Justice Scalia here on

the 18th to make a public speech and you are all invited. He will be
spending the day with us and taking classes and the like. Next year
we will do a similar program and you are all invited. Thanks for
being with us.

51. Id. at 2430 n.5.
52. Id.
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